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Virtuality and Resistance: Situating the Manifesto Between
Command and Political Metamorphosis

Matthew Applegate
Department of Comparative Literature, Binghamton University

This article surveys and identifies contemporary theories of the
manifesto genre’s use and place in radical politics. Following the work
of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri, this article argues that the manifesto comes to be thought as a
mode of spatial and temporal reconfiguration focused in the present,
rather than as a program prophesying or determining the future of
resistance. Indicative of a metamorphosis in the interplay between
state power, capitalist sovereignty and those who resist it, this article’s
primary claim is that the manifesto is not doomed to obsolescence in
the face of new revolutionary forms, but comes to function as a virtual
topography of resistance. In our contemporary moment the manifesto
comes to be theorized and comes to function as a site where multiple
spaces and times of resistance are mobilized against state power and
capitalist sovereignty while its tactical imperatives come to be
articulated absent of a programmatic determination of their use.

What I explore in this paper is the relationship shared between space,
temporality, and virtuality as it comes to bear on a particular genre of
revolutionary expression: the manifesto. My argument is in opposition
to thinkers like Naomi Klein who have asserted the virtual power of
the internet and social media to be the end of the manifesto genre; a
claim that in our contemporary moment follows a line of argument in
which the obsolescence of the manifesto is thought to be a result of
extant revolutionary potential in virtual outlets like Twitter or
Facebook1. Here, I argue in favor of a metamorphosis where the
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genre is concerned and where revolutionary expression is evolving. I
am interested in thinking a politics of the manifesto that exceeds its
own instrumentality. Indeed, I think the manifesto is not only indicative
of an evolution in radical politics, but a primary site of its
reconfiguration. Consequently, the manifesto is treated here as a
provocation toward thinking the shape and character of a fundamental
shift in the operation and organization of radical politics.
Contemporary scholarship on the manifesto spans both disciplinary
and political spectrums; its history and use has been documented and
analyzed in literary, art historical, and philosophical fields, and its
potential for future political organization has been theorized in both
leftist and conservative heritages. But alongside the widespread use
of new media in recent popular movements against state power and
capitalist sovereignty, the manifesto’s place in revolutionary
organization and action takes on a new role. Here, I argue that the
radical potential of the manifesto is actively theorized in our
contemporary moment through its virtual capacities—specifically, as a
mode of spatio-temporal reconfiguration focused in the present, rather
than as a program prophesying or determining the future of
resistance. To make a claim to the manifesto’s so-called virtual
characteristics and capacities is to ground my argument in a
speculative mode of inquiry. It means reviewing, surveying, and
developing a critical potential inherent to the genre, but one that is
perhaps not immediately identifiable. To this end, I offer theoretical
variations on the genre itself and look to a series of manifestos that
challenge its generic determination.
The virtual is deployed here in a Deleuzian sense—I am intent on
considering the manifesto’s extant potential or inherent power for
rethinking political possibility. What this focus demands is thus a
means of parsing out the relation between political writing and action,
or, the impact of manifesto’s generic determinations in political
discourse. Indeed, this is precisely the problematic through which
theorizing the manifesto’s virtual capacities appears. Therefore, the
trajectory of this paper presents two, interrelated problems at its
outset. First, what specifically is the manifesto’s relation to political
action? Second, on what basis can the genre be ascribed virtual
capacity or potential? In its most traditional theorizations, the
manifesto is a form of political writing that calls forth a subject of
resistance and provides a path for its realization. The genre is, in the
very circumstances of its production, a mode of political articulation
and orientation. Virtuality, or what I am calling the manifesto’s virtual
capacities, refers specifically to the avenues of potential that
undergird its political orientation and articulation. In this sense, the
politics of the genre are not a question of left or right, but posed as
processes of reinventing and re-framing our present spatio-temporal
distributions, and even further, the content of our subjective
determinations.
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In a discussion of Vladimir Lenin’s ‘On Slogans’, Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari explore this kind of inherent potential explicitly, claiming
that political writing and action share a relation that is at once
grounded in the real, but also prefigurative of our individual and
collective relations. Deleuze and Guattari make this link explicit in A
Thousand Plateaus in the connection they draw between ‘orderwords’, or ‘the relation of every word or every statement to implicit
presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are, and can only
be, accomplished in the statement,’ and incorporeal transformations,
or, the speculative, transformational attributes that order-words
express (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 79). So the relation between
political writing and action can be thought here as the potential for
what is immanent to language to manifest through, but also outside of
or beyond, the conditions of its enunciation. 'On Slogans’ is a
particularly pointed example of this process because it enacts the very
methods and procedures that are attributed to the manifesto while at
the same time troubling its modes of articulation. Here, Deleuze and
Guattari explain that the inherent power of Lenin’s ‘On Slogans’ is
manifested in the conditions whereby it ‘constituted an incorporeal
transformation that extracted from the masses a proletarian class as
an assemblage of enunciation before the conditions were present for
the proletariat to exist as a body’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 83). It
is the text, then, that calls forth and establishes the material conditions
for the proletariat to appear as a collective assemblage prior to its
formation. The incorporeal transformation that Deleuze and Guattari
name in this example is not simply the formation of a political subject
from the masses, it names an instance in which the virtual or inherent
power of a text effectuates something real.
The import of this paper rests on questioning by what means the
manifesto distributes this kind of virtual conversion—what spatiotemporalizations does it enact and what incorporeal transformations
might be attributed to the genre itself? By way of a brief and
somewhat simplified characterization of the genre, then, my argument
stands in opposition to, or beyond, two primary attributes thought to
be characteristic of the genre. In the course of this paper, I propose to
consider the function of the manifesto against an ought or intent to
command revolutionary struggle that would name its future and
provide the political program to manifest it. Relatedly, I move to
problematize the bi-partisan, ‘us’ vs. ‘them,’ ‘friend vs. enemy’ relation
that is so often asserted where the manifesto names a revolutionary
telos. For it is precisely a question of how the manifesto articulates
and orients political action that is of concern here. Indeed, it is
precisely in theorizing virtuality that the genre’s theorization, use, and
operation potentially shift.
Following from these claims, this paper is divided into four parts. First,
I survey and review popular arguments concerned with the
historiography and political function of the manifesto genre as such.
Here, the manifesto’s use and function in political discourse is parsed
out; however, in a more substantive move, I work to identify several
limitations imposed on the genre by its strictly historiographical
3
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theorization. Janet Lyon and Martin Puchner, two contemporary
theorists of the manifesto genre, are my primary interlocutors here.
Out of this examination, I shift my point of analysis to account for the
concepts and practices that modify contemporary political articulation
and thus political organization. The manifesto genre is situated at the
center of these debates. In this second section, I give a first indication
of what a contemporary political manifesto might look like in a
discussion of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire. Third, I turn
to arguments posed by Gilles Deleuze in his 1969 Logic of Sense in
order to more clearly and rigorously theorize the manifesto’s virtual
transformations and spatio-temporalizations. Here, I argue that
demands on contemporary political struggle produce a situation in
which the manifesto’s modes of representation and spatio-temporal
interventions are reinvented. However, the genre’s reinvention is not
positioned toward the reformation of the party, the formation of a new
political program, or a novel position of command on and over political
action. Rather, it is anti-programmatic—the manifesto is a site of
possible encounters that demands action, but refuses to command its
ultimate shape. Finally, in giving an account of anarcho-communist
collective Tiqqun’s This is Not a Program, I offer an example of what a
contemporary manifesto could be and a commentary on the continued
viability of the genre in political action.
Manifesto, Manual, Map
What I cite above as two problems where the genre is considered is
well documented, albeit rarely challenged or problematized, in the
work of two contemporary literary and cultural theorists, Janet Lyon
and Martin Puchner. In her Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern,
Lyon identifies the manifesto’s programmatic function, writing:
The manifesto occupies a distinct generic space in the arena of
public discourse, and thereby aspires to a concrete form of cultural
work even if it only rarely performs that work. More specifically, the
manifesto provides a foothold in a culture’s dominant ideology by
creating generic speaking positions; the nascent audience
interpellated by ‘we’ is then held together as a provisional
constituency through a linguistic contract. The potential audience of
this contractual ‘we’ occupies the position of either supporting or
rejecting the manifesto as a representative text. (Lyon 1999, p. 24)

Later, she emphasizes the manifesto’s seemingly inherent prophetic
function as well as its bipartisan figuration of the political—the
formation of a ‘we’ or an ‘us’ against ‘them’—writing that ‘the
manifesto’s revolutionary speaking position constructs political
certainty, in other words, not just by reinforcing polemical fields, but
also by assuming control of the language of history, the conditions of
the plot’ (Lyon 1999, p. 60). On this reading, the manifesto’s primary
purpose is to carve out a speaking position within the domain of public
discourse so as to unify and manifest a constituency heretofore
excluded by a particular state or culture’s dominant ideologies. Stated
another way, Lyon understands the manifesto to participate in a
4
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discourse of universal equality that circumscribes its political
interventions. Her theorization of the genre understands marginalized
or oppressed groups to utilize the manifesto as a means of gaining
social recognition and parity within a putatively democratic culture.
Any threat of an anti-statist movement, an alter-national movement,
etc., that would disavow or work to dissolve a culture’s dominant
ideology altogether results from an individual or group’s inability to
receive his, her, or its demands. On Lyon’s interpretation, the
manifesto is, in the first instance, a reformist enterprise, rather than a
more radical attempt at living and thinking in total opposition to state
power and capitalist sovereignty.
In at least two arguments featured in his Poetry of the Revolution:
Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-Gardes, Martin Puchner
recapitulates an argument in favor of the manifesto’s seemingly
inherent programmatic and prophetic functions, arguing that the
politics of the genre establish a revolutionary historiography that it
subsequently works to manifest. Described as an internal mechanism
of the genre, Puchner claims that the manifesto ‘projects a scenario
for which it must then seek to be the first realization’ (Puchner 2006,
p. 29). As the genre came to take on a concrete form in the twentieth
century, Puchner argues that this mode of projection, inherent to the
genre, became synonymous with a universal program for attaining
political power: ‘Even if many of the projects outlined in manifestos
were never realized, what became firmly established was the act of
declaring a new departure, of setting one ism against the next, and of
laying claim to the future at the expense of the past. What succeeded,
in other words, was the revolutionary historiography dictated by the
form of the manifesto’ (Puchner 2006, pp. 70-1). Departing only
slightly from Lyon, Puchner claims that the manifesto not only
commands the language of history, it necessarily organizes revolution
as a narrative of supersession and supplantation. The manifesto
concretizes a revolutionary historiography by opposing former political
forms toward the inception of the new.
The means and the politics by which the manifesto charts sociopolitical terrains is constitutive of its intervention, easily given over to
either statist or minoritarian ideologies. Both Lyon and Puchner
acknowledge this, ultimately favoring to theorize and focus on the
moments wherein the manifesto affirms and concretizes a universal
political operation and language. With this theorization of the genre,
however, specific limitations on its use and operation are imposed and
reinforced. Where Lyon understands the manifesto to construct
political certainty, assuming control over the language of history and
polarizing political fields, the genre is thought to operate solely as a
program for attaining liberation and political power. On Puchner’s
argument, the genre cannot organize revolutionary struggle outside of
a dialectical bind that both linearizes political struggle and reinforces a
bipartisan model for political thought and action.

5
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By way of a brief example, the features of the genre theorized above
are identified in and generalized from Marx and Engels Communist
Manifesto. Indeed, it is Lyon and Puchner’s featured example. In its
preface, we are witness to The Communist Manifesto’s global
aspirations:
It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the
whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and
meet this nursery tale of the specter of communism with a
manifesto of the party itself. To this end, Communists of various
nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following
Manifesto, to be published in English, French, German, Italian,
Flemish and Danish languages. (Marx & Engels 2008, p. 2)

Here, Marx definitively takes command over the language of history,
certainly, the languages of the industrialized world, and attempts to
unify the working class under a communist party platform. In the first
chapter, partisan relations are oriented between and by two opposing
classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This fundamental
bipartisanship gives shape to the manifesto’s global movement. For,
where the first cause of the manifesto is derived from the claim that
‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class
struggles,’ the liberation of the working class is thought to manifest in
the unification of the proletariat and its violent confrontation with the
bourgeoisie: ‘working men of all countries, unite’ (Marx & Engels
2008, p. 3, 39)!
As both Lyon and Puchner take Marx and Engel’s Communist
Manifesto to be the paradigmatic example of the manifesto in radical
politics, what remains constant in the manifesto’s revolutionary
historiography is the place of the political. Here, the manifesto is
theorized as a practice of positing a revolutionary future and
establishing the ground for its eventual fruition. In this way, the
manifesto operates as a manual for attaining political power; the
genre is either utilized as a step-by-step guide for creating and
maintaining statist and nationalist political projects or inciting
revolution and attaining state-like power. Indeed, these two uses of
the genre are not far removed from each other. It is the tension
produced by these two operations of the genre, however, that I am
here intent on exploring: the simultaneous acts of mapping a sociopolitical field and the impetus to intervene upon it, coordinate it, and
manage it. This is to say, the political and philosophical issues that
arise as a result of both Lyon and Puchner’s arguments above
concern the way in which the manifesto both marks off a territory—
maps a socio-political field so as to intervene on its cartography—and
redirects its composition.
A Virtual Topography
Two little known arguments, but nonetheless interesting and helpful
with an eye toward this project from Adorno and Horkheimer’s
recently published dialogue, Towards a New Manifesto, and Hardt
6
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and Negri’s Empire, initiate an alternative theorization of the manifesto
genre, divergent from Lyon and Puchner’s arguments above. Adorno
and Horkheimer’s project is to theorize the political conditions for a
new communist manifesto, a communist manifesto for the twentieth
century. Acknowledging that political landscapes have changed
significantly over the hundred years or so since the publication of
Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto, they imagine the work and
politics of a new manifesto to be something quite different. Rather
than assert a globalized political platform, define the terms of a
necessary antagonism for revolutionary fruition, or work to interpellate
disparate populations into a unitary political subjectivity, they
ultimately abdicate from asserting any claim to revolutionary certainty.
It is near the conclusion of their dialogue that they mark what is
perhaps their most significant divergence from Marx and Engels,
writing: ‘What we reject is not practice but telling people what to do.
Because we are still permitted to live, we are under an obligation to do
something’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 2011, p. 109). Here, Adorno and
Horkheimer establish a political ground from which to theorize the
manifesto genre in opposition to a political program. This is to say, it is
a manifesto exclusive of command that Adorno and Horkheimer
gesture toward in the quotation above, and a way of theorizing a
politics of resistance that encourages action without authoritarian
impulses.
The associated political problems of theorizing a programless
manifesto are provocative—what is a manifesto if not a political
program? Further, what does a radical politics look like absent of a
center of command? Here, I think that what might be interpreted as
uncertainty or ambivalence toward revolutionary praxis might be
better framed as a concern that presages what Michel Foucault would
pose as a question in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s AntiOedipus: ‘How does one keep from being a fascist, even (especially)
when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant’ (Foucault
1985, p. xiii)? This is to say, I think the formation and expression of a
programless manifesto is not to argue for a formless and directionless
politics. What is at stake in the movement to create the conditions for
a manifesto against a political program is the desire to organize a
revolutionary force without representing a revolutionary future in the
form of a totality, and further, without internalizing and redeploying an
uncompromising position of command. Reluctant to tell revolutionaries
what the future of resistance should look like or how we should get
there, Adorno and Horkheimer fundamentally shift the terms of
political action and thought. It is, against Lyon and Puchner’s
theorization of the genre, a move to call forth and represent a radical
politics without its collapse into a political doctrine or a battle of –isms.
So the question of fomenting a new, radical politics absent of a
political program approached by Adorno and Horkheimer has a twopronged effect. On the one hand, their project comes to bear on the
organization of a radical politics and a radical movement. On the other
hand, Adorno and Horkheimer’s project, where it is certainly the result
of an era of nationalized fascisms and genocide, also signals a
7
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profound shift in the operation of sovereign power on a transnational
scale. One key insight with reference to the dialogue is the question of
America—whether it is a truly democratic enterprise and therefore a
political model to affirm or if the seat of fascism has merely relocated
itself across the Atlantic2. We can take another cue from twentieth and
twenty-first century Continental thought. Post-WWII, fascism hasn’t
been eliminated and it hasn’t disappeared, rather it takes on new
forms with various names, something like micro-fascisms, societies of
control and technologies of securitization, or the interplay of molar and
molecular milieus.
What Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialogue signals is thus a
contemporary problem. How should resistance be organized and
expressed in the face of a shifting globalized political terrain? Hardt
and Negri intervene precisely at this juncture, offering both an
alternative ground from which to theorize the manifesto genre and an
alternative analytic of resistance. In their coauthored Empire, the first
of the three part Empire series, Hardt and Negri write of the manifesto
genre, some 50 years or so after Adorno and Horkheimer’s dialogue,
that:
Today a manifesto, a political discourse, should aspire to fulfill a
Spinozist prophetic function, the function of an immanent desire
that organizes the multitude. There is not finally here any
determinism or utopia: this is rather a radical counterpower,
ontologically grounded not on any ‘vide pour le futur’ but on the
actual activity of the multitude, its creation, production, and
power—a materialist teleology. (Hardt & Negri 2001, p. 66)

Interestingly, a debate ensued on Empire’s status as a new
communist manifesto immediately following its publication. Perhaps
best identified in Slavoj Zizek’s ‘Have Hardt and Negri Written The
Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century?’ Empire is
asserted to be both an exercise in rethinking and rewriting the
possible use and function of the genre and a text that is able to
‘describe globalization as an ambiguous “deterritorialization”’ (Zizek
2001, p. 192). In a manner that extends beyond Marx and Engels’
Communist Manifesto, Empire analyzes how ‘victorious global
capitalism pushes into every pore of our social lives, into the most
intimate of spheres, and installs an ever present dynamic, which no
longer is based on patriarchal or other hierarchic structures of
dominance’ (Zizek 2001, p. 192). Zizek is right to pose the project of
the manifesto as a question in reference to Empire. With Hardt and
Negri’s comments above, they seem to refuse the formal political
imperatives of traditional manifestos. In their newly coauthored
pamphlet, Declaration, Hardt and Negri say as much, claiming that:
Manifestos provide a glimpse of a world to come and also call into
being the subject, who although now only a specter must
materialize to become the agent of change. Manifestos work like
the ancient prophets, who by the power of their vision create their
own people. Today's social movements have reversed the order,

8
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making manifestos and prophets obsolete. (Hardt & Negri 2012, p.
1)

A blunt but nonetheless interesting claim, Hardt and Negri’s
comments here are a theoretical continuation of Adorno and
Horkheimer’s project and a departure from it. For, given both claims
about the manifesto, it is questionable as to whether Hardt and Negri
are declaring the death of a genre or if they are declaring the death of
a particular form of theorizing and organizing radical politics. What is
clear is that the manifesto genre is in question and in transformation,
and it is of particular socio-political conditions that its continued
efficacy and transformation is produced.
Without getting too caught up in its alleged formation and operation,
the multitude, Hardt and Negri’s figure of revolutionary production and
expression, finds its basis in three universal political platforms that
command resistance and its futural interventions. To cite from
Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri write:
A first platform must demand the support of life against misery, that
is, simply, that governments must provide everyone with the basic
means of life . . . a second platform must demand equality against
hierarchy, allowing everyone to be capable of participating in the
constitution of society; collective self-rule, and constructive
interaction with others . . . a third platform must demand open
access to the common against the barriers of private property.
(Hardt & Negri 2011, pp. 380-1)

Given these three platforms, the multitude is theorized as an absolute
democratic horizon proper to contemporary forms of resistance, anticapitalist or otherwise. Insofar as the multitude is produced as a
resistant force to state power and capitalist sovereignty, it finds its
basis in the elimination of misery, equality against hierarchy, and
access to the common in every instance. The democratic future
produced if the multitude is actualized is thus conditioned by these
three platforms. It is important to note that, with a slight twist, these
platforms are articulated differently in Empire, focused more on
demands for global citizenship and creativity3. What this position
allows Hardt and Negri, however, is a means to reformulate and
redefine the focus and intent of revolutionary violence. As resistance
is exercised by the multitude, any compulsion or implementation of
violent tactics is reconfigured and made subject to its democratic
principles. Guided by Hardt and Negri’s platforms, the organization of
the multitude is somehow able to debate, avow, and even
reconceptualize the focus and intent of resistance, as it moves to rend
any democratic use of violence from producing destruction on an
excessive or mass scale. The violence of the multitude thus somehow
reduces destruction to a minimum as it is guided by democratic
principles of self-governance. Two arguments in Multitude: War and
Democracy in the Age of Empire are indicative of this process. Here,
Hardt and Negri assert that:

9
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The third principle of the democratic use of violence has to do with
democratic organization itself. If according to the first principle the
use of violence is always subordinated to political process and
decision, and if that political process is democratic, organized in the
horizontal, common formation of the multitude, then the use of
violence too must be organized democratically. Wars waged by
sovereign powers have always required the suspension of
freedoms and democracy. The organized violence of its military
requires strict, unquestioned authority. The democratic use of
violence must be entirely different. There can be no separation
between means and ends. (Hardt & Negri 2004, p. 345)

Here, the primary difference between the multitude’s use of violence
and that of non-democratic entities is as much one of organization as
it is one of compulsion. Let me clarify by saying that Hardt and Negri
do give lip service to a democratic, horizontal, common formation of
the multitude as they subsequently assert a new, democratic form of
violence as a result of its organization. How the violence of the
multitude is organized and what this new form of democratic violence
might be remains absent from any substantive theorization of armed
struggle. Here, Hardt and Negri simply conclude this discussion by
claiming: ‘We need to create weapons that are not merely destructive
but are themselves forms of constituent power, weapons capable of
constructing democracy and defeating the armies of Empire’ (Hardt &
Negri 2005, p. 347). I take this claim to directly correspond to the idea
that democratic violence is efficient and minimized as there is no
separation between means and ends.
What, then, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has changed?
What allows for, but also, what creates the need for revolutionary
expression and the manifesto, a privileged mode of its articulation, to
be called into question and to potentially transform? A slow
transformation in the operation of sovereign power across and beyond
the territory of the nation state—what Hardt and Negri call capitalist
sovereignty and what they call Empire—works to produce the
conditions for alternative forms of resistance. It is what Foucault terms
governmentality, or a spatial division of technologies of security
simultaneous with the capitalization of a territory absent of a center
and an outside4. To put it another way, there is a novelty in the
condition from which sovereign power no longer functions as a
centrifugal force within a given territory, but a centripetal one over and
beyond the territory: it becomes an apparatus of administration rather
than a mere lord of the law. Hardt and Negri’s claim is that it is a
spatial reconfiguration of power from the sovereign nation-state to the
transnational administration of life that works hand in hand to produce
the conditions for a reconfiguration of an entire genre of resistance.
Two points are of note, then, both in reference to the immanent desire
that organizes the multitude and its actual activity. At least with
reference to the manifesto, I think Hardt and Negri are correct in
Empire to focus on its revolutionary effect, or perhaps power, as a
turn toward the virtual—as having the potential to radically redistribute
10
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the focus and location of revolutionary intent. Indeed, I think their
claim in Declaration underscores this idea, albeit through the declared
end of the genre. With such a radical revisioning of the relation
between sovereign power and resistance, the question of whether or
not the written expression of a new politics of resistance can still be
called a manifesto is critical. Where the expression of a radical politics
is not a question of telling anyone what to do, not a question of
determinism or utopia, but an immanent desire toward the spatiotemporal reconfiguration of the present, the potential in and of its
actual activity is simultaneously aggregated and dispersed. The
political work of the manifesto in this context is focused in the present
and in one’s present company—on the actual activity of those who
resist state power and capitalist sovereignty—without asserting the
need for the unity of a political program or calling forth a unitary
political subjectivity.
I think the work to theorize the place and function of the manifesto
genre in contemporary politics is precisely the kind of weapon that
Hardt and Negri imagine in their political odyssey. To theorize and to
write a manifesto without determinism or utopia but with the
compulsion to act is precisely a way to reschematize political fields, to
change the formal structure of an entire genre of resistance, and to
focus on manifesting alternative spaces and times of resistance,
adapted to a shifting, globalized political terrain. Empire itself is a kind
of quasi-manifesto that calls forth a new set of rules and pushes the
boundaries of what the manifesto can do. Indeed, where a
theorization of the genre more generally calls for an end of ancient
prophets manifesting a political program and revolutionary
subjectivity, political expression is no longer for the project of
producing a manual authorizing and determining revolutionary action,
it produces a novel ‘incorporeal transformation.’ Here, the genre
comes to function as a virtual topography, or landscape that outlines
and distributes possible avenues for resistance. A manifesto in this
context, if it is to persist, would become a far more ephemeral and
situational genre; it would function as a site of spatio-temporal
reconfiguration, but only insofar as its political orientation continues to
resonate with the direction of resistance.
Mapping the Virtual, Re-Theorizing Resistance
On this point, I propose to address the problems of political orientation
a step or two beyond the claim that the contemporary organization
and expression of resistance is not about telling people what to do.
With such a radical shift in thinking the organization and force of
resistance to state power and capitalist sovereignty, alternative
models for resistance are demanded. So, if the shift in the
organization and operation of resistance and, indeed, a primary genre
through which resistance is articulated, can no longer be expressed
with a manual-like function, what does a turn toward the virtual
actually produce? If the manifesto is to be theorized as a virtual
landscape of possible interaction for resistance rather than a
11
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prophetic vision, how does it work? With Adorno, Horkheimer, Hardt,
and Negri calling the manifesto’s formal structure and political impact
into question, theorizing the manifesto today necessitates uncovering
what models of representation are available for expressing a radical
politics in the twenty-first century as much as it necessitates
considering the way it schematizes political fields. However, contra
Hardt and Negri’s project in the Empire series, disassociating the
manifesto from its structure of command is much less about inventing
a new revolutionary figure than it is about actualizing alternative times
and places for resistance to manifest. Indeed, new revolutionary
figures like the multitude or the 99% are common and do not seem to
produce or display the revolutionary characteristics attributed to them.
Certainly, this is where Hardt and Negri’s theorization of the genre
and call for its end requires further clarification; precisely how does
the manifesto, reformulated as a radical counterpower, either fail or
work to produce a multiplicity of times and spaces for resistance?
Theorizing a programless manifesto, despite the political ends that
either Adorno and Horkheimer or Hardt and Negri claim, is primarily a
political and philosophical question of representation. It poses the
problem of claiming that radical alternatives to the present actually
exist without producing them as a totality. Indeed, positing a
programless manifesto creates the problem of claiming that there is a
time and place after the revolution that can be derived from our
present social and political conditions, without saying what it is. As
stated above, this problem does not lead to a formless or directionless
politics, nor does it lead to political quietism. It affirms a vital and
dynamic potential for revolutionary expression. Here, the manifesto’s
experimental theorization and possible end signals a shift away from
Lyon’s arguments on representation, particularly where she claims
that one of the manifesto’s fundamental characteristics is to
interpellate a ‘we’ that will demand recognition or struggle to attain it.
One of Lyon’s most forceful arguments in Manifestoes: Provocations
of the Modern is that the manifesto’s modes of representation have a
distinct temporality. In several instances Lyon asserts that the time of
the manifesto is now, literally, now, constituting the genre as a kind of
revolutionary axis that ultimately recalibrates linear and progressive
temporal formations5. Puchner affirms this temporal formulation with a
slight twist. Where the manifesto calls for revolution now, it speculates
and establishes possible futures that will have been affirmed at a later
date: ‘the speech acts of the manifesto are thus launched in the
anterior future, claiming that their authority will have been provided by
the changes they themselves want to bring about’ (Puchner 2006, p.
24). In this way, the future tense is effective only insofar as it
manifests the temporal conditions of the now. In a second temporal
figuration, Lyon claims that the manifesto enacts a particular
spatialization as it spans history; it ‘bridges the different episodes of
the “permanent revolution” by acting as a kind of radical Esperanto
across decades and nations and cultures’ (Lyon 1999, p. 60).
Following this argument, the manifesto formalizes revolutionary
actions and tactics into distinctive revolutionary episodes where its
12
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temporality and capacity for representation traverses history. The ‘we’
that is established and represented by the manifesto is at the very
same time the revolutionary body that propels its temporal
interventions.
Perhaps one of the more practical applications of Adorno,
Horkheimer, Hardt, and Negri’s theorizations of the manifesto genre is
that they work to displace the subject from a position of being
represented by text, a political program, or a state, and focus on
developing a tactics with which to disrupt authoritarian impulses. An
alternative theorization of the genre and an alternative use demands
that the manifesto’s modes of representation and spatio-temporal
interventions be reinvented. A programless manifesto would not posit
the question, does this manifesto speak for me, does it adequately
describe my cause and provide a remedy to the problem now?
Rather, it poses the question, does this manifesto impart a
composition of techniques for resistance, does it resonate in
conditions of struggle or does it remain indecipherable?
In The Logic of Sense, his last major work preceding Anti-Oedipus
and A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze addresses the political
concerns at work in a re-theorization of the manifesto as he produces
an analysis of representation that affirms the virtual, rethinking
spatialization and underscoring non-linear temporalities. More than
this, he offers alternative models for representing a radical politics by
restructuring the ways that representation functions. Here, we could
say that Deleuze offers a mechanics of what he later terms the
incorporeal transformation, writing:
Representation must encompass an expression which it does not
represent, but without which it itself would not be ‘comprehensive,’
and would have truth only by chance or from outside . . . There is a
‘use’ of representation, without which representation would remain
lifeless and senseless. Wittgenstein and his disciples are right to
define meaning by means of use. But such use is not defined
through a function of representation in relation to the represented,
nor even through representativeness as the form of possibility.
Here, as elsewhere, the functional is transcended in the direction of
a topology, and use is in the relation between representation and
something extra-representative, a nonrepresented and merely
expressed entity. Representation envelops the event in another
nature, it envelops it at its borders, it stretches until this point, and it
brings about this lining or hem. (Deleuze 1990, p. 146)

On Deleuze’s account, representation refers to something concrete,
but also to an alternative temporality and spatialization that cannot be
reduced to what is represented. In other words, when something is
posited, like a possible future that stands in opposition to the present,
its representation is at once defined by its use, or maybe even by its
intention, but is not equivalent to a programmatic determination of the
future. Representation refuses its capture and its use is located in
what exceeds the representation itself. So the use of positing an
alternative future is not in enforcing its realization, making what is real
13
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conform to a vision of what it should be, but in locating the tactics and
techniques through which radical futures take shape in the present.
Deleuze theorizes representation within a temporal fold, a topological
figuration of time in which time and space are indiscernible events.
Within this figuration of time, representation is in a constant state of
flux, changing and overlapping as it is put into use. So given this
spatio-temporalization of representation, it cannot be reduced to its
prophecy—to a progressive linearity or a moment in which the future
is programmatically determined. To quote Deleuze: ‘this is the use of
representation: the mime, and no longer the fortune teller. One stops
going from the greatest present toward a future and past which are
said only of a smaller present; on the contrary, one goes from the
future and past as unlimited, all the way to the smallest present of a
pure instant which is endlessly subdivided’ (Deleuze 1990, p. 147).
On this point, Deleuze marks a crucial difference where he considers
the temporal figure of the present. Where the now refers to the
moment in which history is and can redetermine its path or line, he
turns to the instant, a temporal frontier in which multiple environs
come to be articulated as coconstitutive zones of relation, without
linear progression. In Deleuze’s words, where the instant stands
opposed to the now, ‘it is no longer the future and past which subvert
the existing present; it is the instant which perverts the present into
inhering future and past’ (Deleuze 1990, p. 165). Here, representation
becomes a form of expression actualized by the instant; it becomes a
question of how a multiplicity of times and spaces are harnessed, but
also how a multiplicity of times and spaces exceeds the way its
relation and movement are rendered.
Accordingly, what Deleuze’s assertions afford are not merely an
alternative way of thinking representation, time, and space but an
alternative way of thinking the effects of the manifesto’s relation to
history. Certainly, it necessitates a reconsideration of the manifesto’s
very techniques of expression aligned with the projects outlined above
by both Lyon and Puchner. For both theorists, the temporal figure of
the now cites a break and collapse in time. Where the manifesto
breaks with progressive, hegemonic histories, past, present, and
future are located at once within the same temporal zone of
enunciation and implementation: past and future come to be
concentrated in the present. This is to say, the now of the manifesto is
supposed to establish a unitary and immediate temporal mode of
revolutionary action in which the present tense functions as both a
revelation and a pivot—the now of the manifesto calls an end to the
current order of history, but also acts as the rotating point at which
history is re-determined. In so many words, this is how the manifesto
is thought to enact its prophetic function, the revelatory event that
redirects a particular milieu toward an alternative future as it assumes
historical and political certainty. Lyon’s second formulation of the
manifesto’s temporality establishes a problem of a different order.
While claiming that the manifesto spreads out across time, linking
revolutionary acts as they are expressed in and through the genre
might seem like a temporal mode of expansion, it rather contributes to
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the concentration of time in the present. The revolutionary now of the
manifesto comes to function as a kind of spatio-temporal regulation,
territorializing revolutionary struggle within a unitary temporal mode of
intervention. Stated another way, the manifestic immediacy of the now
operates as a kind of territory of time, concentrating revolutionary
struggle within a single temporal figure. It is precisely here that a
focus on virtuality becomes necessary for fomenting an alternative
theorization of the genre.
If Empire is a text that both theorizes and provokes theorization of the
manifesto genre’s virtual capacities, Timothy C. May’s 1992 Crypto
Anarchist Manifesto is an early example of how the genre might
distribute its virtual, or inherent power, differently. At the forefront of
the Cyberpunk movement, May authored The Crypto Anarchist
Manifesto immediately prior to the Internet’s popularization and
corporatization, identifying its capacities for anti-capitalist and antistatist political projects. While what he describes might sound like an
amalgam of science fiction and misplaced hope in virtual
technologies, it is, prior to Hardt and Negri’s theorization and call for
the end of the manifesto genre, a move toward producing an
alternative political landscape that emphasizes revolutionary
interaction through anonymity, rather than the manifestation of a
revolutionary program and subject. Here, May writes:
A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto
anarchy. Computer technology is on the verge of providing the
ability for individuals and groups to communicate and interact with
each other in a totally anonymous manner. Two persons may
exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate electronic
contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of
the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via
extensive re-routing of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes
which implement cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect
assurance against any tampering . . . Just as the technology of
printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and the
social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods
fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and of government
interference in economic transactions. Combined with emerging
information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for
any and all material which can be put into words and pictures. (May
1992)

While May maintains the language of The Communist Manifesto,
anticipating an imminent futural state in which revolutionary capacities
will be realized, his use of the genre ultimately alters its form and
function. First, it does not command a subject or a revolutionary
strategy; it names a practice of resistance and speculates on its
possible uses. The manifesto is, in this instance, a tool with which to
liquefy the market and refuse the operation of government: to live and
to act against and beyond corporate and sovereign capture. A primary
benefit of computer technology cited in this manifesto is the
proliferation of and interaction through anonymity. A revolutionary
body or subject is not called forth; it is formed, maintained, and
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dispersed in erasure. In turn, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto
manifests a second virtual function where May mobilizes the genre in
tandem with computer technology to create a multiplicity of places and
times of resistance. Here, computer technology is thought as a virtual
plane from which anonymous interaction is constitutive of relations
that might alter the ways in which power functions at every level:
social, political, and economic, across the globe. Indeed, where new
technological landscapes are developed transnationally, the potential
for resistance to manifest is simultaneously localized and dispersed,
happening here and now but also there, then, and to come. In this
way, the virtual or inherent power of the manifesto genre and
computer technology do not stand opposed—one does not work to
eliminate the other—rather, the manifesto becomes a means of
expressing and schematizing a new way of organizing resistance,
spatially, temporally, and relationally.
Through a kind of theoretical melding of computer technologies and
the manifesto genre, what is produced by The Crypto Anarchist
Manifesto is neither a program nor a multitude, but a field and a
practice from which resistance might spring. Stated another way, The
Crypto Anarchist Manifesto names the manifesto’s potential metafunction, that of outlining a practice through which incorporeal
transformations might manifest. In this way, The Crypto Anarchist
Manifesto is a sketch toward actualizing the manifesto’s topographic
function as it resists the programmatic determination of its use. It
maps out potential political positions that would modify as they
manifest and are put into practice. Certainly, what May calls
cryptography is precisely the networked interaction of an anonymous
force, following a multiplicity of paths toward total resistance. Insofar
as the manifesto is coterminous with, or perhaps a provocation toward
a radical politics without determinism or utopia, it functions here as a
tool by which revolutionary tactics are learned, modified, or rejected in
continuous adaptation and re-enactment.
Beyond Bipartisan Politics
As the manifesto’s relation to representation shifts, Lyon’s language of
command and Puchner’s revolutionary historiography dictated by the
manifesto no longer makes sense. Neither do their political
categories. If the manifesto’s virtual capacities are championed, its
spatio-temporal interventions are no longer predicated on the
movement of one –ism triumphing over another, moving toward a
revolutionary future. Deleuze’s analysis of representation, space, and
time above refuses these modes of sublation and replaces them with
a threshold for disjunction. As a form of expression actualized in the
instant representation allows for total opposition and difference to
proliferate rather than political unification in a doctrine, an –ism, or
even a program to dominate thought and action. A politics of the
genre in opposition and irreducible to a political program thus
necessitates theorizing how the manifesto creates opportunities for
living a radical politics, rather than how it institutes a framework
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wherein it would establish and subsequently dictate a revolutionary
historiography. This position necessitates something more than
theorizing new models of representation for expressing a radical
politics; it necessitates a reconfiguration of its political relations.
Indeed, it requires rethinking the processes through which the
manifesto participates in schematizing political fields and orienting
political action. Therefore, even with a theorization of the genre
opposed to Lyon and Puchner, the problem of partisanship hinted at
in the introduction doesn’t disappear, it is all the more an imminent
concern.
While Adorno and Horkheimer don’t pursue the question of a new
manifesto far enough to consider a reinvention of partisan relations,
Hardt and Negri seem to overcompensate for this absence, insisting
on the invention of the multitude and asserting its novel capabilities for
resistance. But if Hardt and Negri are correct to claim that the
landscape of power and resistance is now both transnational and
constituted by the actual activities of those who resist state power and
capitalist sovereignty, resistance operates as a shifting terrain,
susceptible to constant modification. Under such conditions, partisan
relations become far more difficult to identify. Where an ‘outside’ of
power can no longer be assumed, the neat existential division and
opposition between friends and enemies, certainly the very
categorical determination of either position, is equally difficult to parse.
Even if one were to concede to Hardt and Negri, claiming the
manifesto’s obsolescence in favor of a new radical political project,
partisan relations are not eliminated from the political, they transform.
It is on this point that Lyon and Puchner’s theorization of the
manifesto genre display a critical insight into the organization of the
political as such. It is precisely the manifesto’s polemics concomitant
with its assumption of revolutionary certainty that determines political
relations. Where the political is reducible to a set of antagonistic
forces, the path toward a revolutionary future is clear: compete with
the enemy and to the victor goes the spoils. Chantal Mouffe parses
out the stakes of this framework in a similar language to Lyon and
Puchner above, stating:
In the domain of collective identifications, where what is in question
is the creation of a ‘we’ by the delimitation of a ‘them’, the
possibility always exists that this we/them relation will turn into a
relation of the friend/enemy type; in other words it can always
become political in [Carl] Schmitt’s understanding of the term. This
can happen when the other, who was until then considered only
under the mode of difference, begins to be perceived as negating
our identity, as putting in question our very existence. From that
moment onwards, any type of we/them relation, be it religious,
ethnic, national, economic or other, becomes the site of a political
antagonism. (Mouffe 2006, pp. 2-3)

What Mouffe’s argument draws out is that the modes of
representation that both Lyon and Puchner attribute to the manifesto
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always seem to result in the same fundamental political relation. If the
manifesto remains a process of command, supersession, and a battle
of –isms, then it will continually reproduce the same political
antagonisms. Carl Schmitt provides a particularly problematic, yet
concise understanding of how the friend/enemy relation operates in
The Concept of the Political, one that is attributable to Lyon and
Puchner’s theorization of the manifesto genre. Here, Schmitt writes,
‘the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation,’
yet, the enemy ‘is nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is
sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way,
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case
conflicts with him are possible’ (Schmitt 2007, pp. 26-7). Where
Schmitt imagines political relations to exist in and between nations, or
perhaps better described as nationally unified partisan bodies, the
logical structure of the friend/enemy split is what Lyon and Puchner
affirm as the manifesto maps a socio-political field and directs its
composition. Both Lyon’s analysis of representation and Puchner’s
claim to a revolutionary historiography dictated by the manifesto fall
squarely within a Schmittian definition of the political and describe
political relations as an expression of state power or homologous to
state power. While this does make political concepts and political
relations clear, it does not rethink the manifesto’s spatio-temporal
interventions. Indeed, it affirms Hardt and Negri’s condemning
remarks about the genre.
Perhaps the most provocative claim in Hardt and Negri’s Empire
series is that power over life, indeed, production itself, constitutes a
partisan relation that might be aligned with an entirely different set of
social and political relations. This is to say, what is necessary for the
multitude to function as a radical counterpower is the production of an
alternative political relation, reschematizing political fields, and
affirming the power of bodies in struggle. Straight and to the point,
Hardt and Negri claim that ‘all notions that pose the power of
resistance as homologous or even similar to the power that oppresses
us are of no more use’ (Hardt & Negri 2005, p. 90). It is here that the
focus on production takes precedent over all other political forms and
tactics in the name of the multitude. If resistance cannot be conceived
in a homologous relation to state power and capitalist sovereignty, it
must actively exceed it, breaking from a cycle in which those who
resist simply react to Empire with an equal or corresponding relation
in structure and origin. Here, Hardt and Negri write, ‘biopolitics is a
partisan relationship between subjectivity and history that is crafted by
a multitudinous strategy, formed by events and resistances, and
articulated by a discourse that links political decision making to the
construction of bodies in struggle’ (Hardt & Negri 2011, p. 61). A
positive biopolitical project, or a positive form of production and
administration over life, is what actualizes the multitude and a new set
of partisan relations; it is what unites Hardt and Negri’s democratic
principles of violence with the organization of the multitude as well as
what allows for the emergence of alternative times and spaces for
resistance.
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In its own quasi-political pamphlet and manifesto, This is Not a
Program, anarcho-communist collective Tiqqun is quick to criticize
Hardt and Negri on these points, claiming that Negri in particular fails
to rid the concepts of Empire and the multitude of authoritarian
compulsions:
The three watchwords typical of political Negrism–for all its strength
lies in its ability to provide informal neo-militants with issues on
which to focus their demands–are the ‘citizens dividend,’ the right
to free movement (‘Papers for everyone!’), and the right to
creativity, especially if computer-assisted. In this sense, the Negrist
perspective is in no way different from the imperial perspective but
rather a mere instance of perfectionism within it . . . Hence political
Negrism’s incestuous relationship with imperial pacification: it
wants reality but not its realism. It wants Biopolitics without police,
communication without Spectacle, peace without having to wage
war to get it. Strictly speaking, Negrism does not coincide with
imperial thought; it is simply the idealist face of political thought.
(Tiqqun 2011, pp. 117-18)

Here, the focus of the collective’s criticism lies in the idea that the
transnational administration of life, across and beyond territorial
boundaries, can be democratically controlled. Where Hardt and Negri
insist on the inherent democratic authority of the multitude, they belie
their revolutionary project. To use a similar language at work in their
theorization of the manifesto, the multitude is a showcase of both
determinism and utopia, grounded in an idealized vision of future.
Tiqqun does however maintain Hardt and Negri’s claim that
homologous relations to state power and capitalist sovereignty are
inadequate, refocusing their attention on a reinvention of partisan
relations.
In the opening essay of its This is Not a Program, Tiqqun asserts the
need for a redefinition of social and political antagonism, framing the
redefinition of the political as a question of organizing life: ‘A
redefinition of historical conflict is needed, not intellectually: vitally’
(Tiqqun 2011, p. 12). This is to say, the political is, for Tiqqun, not a
question of asserting new, or rehabilitating what they consider to be
antiquated, epistemological categories through which to organize and
define antagonism and conflict, it is rather the organization of a
concept of partisanship that finds its constitution in forms of life that
exceed, oppose, and redistribute a revolutionary telos. Indeed, the
question of a revolutionary telos is challenged and rejected in their
redefinition of the political as Tiqqun works toward thinking and living
out reengineered modes of antagonism, conflict, and resistance. Most
importantly class, stemming from a Marxist figuration of social and
political antagonism wherein two unified forces come to oppose each
other in a battle for supersession and hegemony, is the limit to which
the political is constrained prior to and within the present moment.
Here, Tiqqun writes:
Historical conflict no longer opposes two massive molar heaps, two
classes—the exploited and the exploiters, the dominant and the
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dominated, managers and workers—among which, in each
individual case, one could differentiate. The front line no longer cuts
through the middle of society; it now runs through the middle of
each of us, between what makes us a citizen, our predicates, and
all the rest. It is thus in each of us that war is being waged between
imperial socialization and that which already eludes it. A
revolutionary process can be set in motion from any point of the
biopolitical fabric, from any singular situation, by exposing, even
breaking, the line of flight that traverses it. (Tiqqun 2011, p. 12)

Resistance, and hence any partisan formations that result, then, is
conceived of as a practice of life, as an aesthetic, or as a kind of
distribution of the sensible. A vital form of partisanship rests on the
creation of a form of life that is, at its most basic levels of production,
that which opposes and that which exceeds the governing power of
‘biopolitical democracies.’ In this way, Tiqqun names a practice of
resistance without simultaneously calling forth a revolutionary subject.
In a manner similar to that of The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, a virtual
plane of interaction is theorized, and it is this plane of interaction itself
that replaces the formation of revolutionary subjects in homologous
opposition to powers of oppression. Here, Tiqqun also insists on
revolutionary anonymity rather than the formation of a figure or a
subject. The ‘Imaginary Party’ is offered as an alternative to bipartisan
struggle, relying on a categorically different mode of the organization
of life: ‘building the Party means establishing forms-of-life in their
difference, intensifying, complicating relations between them,
developing as subtly as possible civil war between us’ (Tiqqun 2011,
p. 13). This alternative relies not on a comprehension of or
epistemological command over the relations that give rise to social
and political antagonism, but on the circulation of encounters that
‘further the process of ethical polarization,’ thus creating the possibility
for alternative, resistant forms of life (Tiqqun 2011, p. 14).
The title of Tiqqun’s quasi pamphlet and manifesto thus strikes at the
heart of the problematics and possibilities of theorizing the genre as a
provocation toward actualizing a fundamental shift in the operation
and organization of radical politics: This is Not a Program. As a
slogan, this seems to sum up Adorno and Horkheimer’s position while
refusing to let Hardt and Negri monopolize claims toward the possible
reinvention or total extinction of the manifesto genre. Indeed, ‘this is
not a program’ is perhaps the slogan of the manifesto’s own
incorporeal transformation. As programmatic politics are refused, a
complex landscape of revolutionary tactics and expression emerge.
Further, with a reinvention of partisan relations, the means by which a
radical politics is practiced shifts. Defying a homologous or bipartisan
struggle at the heart of the political begins to reshape the language
and expression of resistance: resistance becomes the proliferation of
multiple times and spaces where anti-capitalist and anti-statist forms
of life are lived. Stated another way, the virtual becomes the real.
Consequently, what the contemporary focus on the manifesto genre’s
future, or lack thereof, signifies is a profound desire to reengineer
radical politics from the top down. It is an attempt to reimagine the
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possibilities inherent to a primary genre of revolutionary expression
and a fundamental step toward theorizing and living a radical politics
in the present.
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Notes
1

Klein’s precise claim here is that ‘Thanks to the Net, mobilizations are able
to unfold with sparse bureaucracy and minimal hierarchy; forced consensus
and labored manifestos are fading into the background, replaced instead by
a culture of constant, loosely structured, and sometimes compulsive
information-swapping’ (Klein 2002, p. 267). A condition like this is only
compounded in the contemporary moment with technologies like Facebook,
Twitter, etc.
2

In the section of Towards a New Manifesto titled ‘Political Concreteness,’
Adorno and Horkheimer wrestle with the concern for being too abstract in
their theorization of a new manifesto, but also being too concrete. Indeed, an
argument ensues concerning the idea of drawing a concrete utopic vision
into the project of theorizing a new manifesto along with a set of guiding
political principles. It is here that certain achievements in America are
championed, ‘the reliability of the legal system, drugstores, etcetera’ (Adorno
& Horkheimer 2011, p. 63). Adorno and Horkheimer ultimately conclude the
argument by saying that they ‘must somehow manage to suggest things
rather than say them directly’ (Adorno & Horkheimer 2011, p. 64).
3

In Empire, Hardt and Negri focus seven, rather than three demands of the
multitude. All oriented toward a democratic transnationalism, these seven
demands cohere with Hardt and Negri’s three democratic principles of the
multitude but display a broader spectrum of possibilities within its production
and eventual fruition.
4

Foucault draws this argument out in detail throughout Security, Territory,
Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978.
5

A substance discussion of this problem can be found throughout the first
chapter of Lyon’s Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern.
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